Causation and the Significance of the Natural/Philosophical Relation distinction in Treatise 1.3.6
The main aim of this paper is to explore why it is so important for Hume to define ‘cause' as he does. I take up this question in order to shed light on the significance of the natural/philosophical relation (hereafter NPR) distinction, especially as it is used in Treatise 1.3.6. I argue that the NPR distinction allows Hume to dismiss conceptions of causation at odds with his own; it provides an instance of the normative nature of Hume's "science of man."
Treatise 1.3.6 is much studied in the context of debates over Hume's skepticism, his understanding of "reason," and what has become known as the problem of induction. In this paper, I largely side-step these debates, although I show that even if one thinks that there is no trace of Hume's skepticism in 1.3.6, the section has more bite than is recognized by those advocating the apparent, current scholarly consensus on the......
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Approximate Word Count: 4510
Approximate Pages: 18 (260 words per double-spaced page) |